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ABSTRACT 
With the increasing importance of international joint ventures(IJVs), firms are more 
and more concerned about the general unsatisfactory performance of their IJVs. In 
the recent years, trust has been identified as a very important issue for the success of 
IJVs. Numerous studies have been done on the trust issues in different contexts, 
especially interpersonal trust in social life, trust within the organizations, and trust 
between organizations. However, few studies specify trust issues and their relationship 
with IJVs performance empirically. This study reviews the current literature on 
different dimensions of trust in IJV management such as the concept of trust, the 
measurement of both trustworthiness of the partner and trust level of partner 
relationship. The study also relates trust with important aspects of IJV management: 
organizational control systems, conflict resolution, performance evaluation, IJV 
instability, and cultural difference management. A research methodology focusing on 
case study has been designed for further empirical study on trust issues in IJVs. A 
questionnaire for the survey embedded in the case study is also explored. 
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In the past two decades, the world has seen an explosion of economic 
cooperation among firms either domestically and internationally. Anderson (1990) 
reported that more joint venture (JV) arrangements have been established since 1981 
than existed in the past. The fast changing global economic situation and business 
environment, the amazing speed of technological development, the globalization of the 
world market and the intensive global competition, all increase the interdependence of 
firms and drive them to seek strategic cooperation (Lewis, 1990). 
By cooperation, the firms involved try to make best use of their distinctive 
competencies to achieve the maximum benefits which cannot be reached by either 
partner doing alone. 
There are several ways firms cooperate. However, joint venture (JV) has 
become the most popular one. "Joint ventures are formed when two or more firms 
pool their resources into a common legal entity. They are used to create synergies 
through combining resources, increasing market power, sharing risks, cutting cost, and 
improving efficiency." (Chen，Hu, Shieh, 1991:32) The two basic patterns for JV 
formation are "horizontal" ventures in which the partners make similar inputs and 
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"quasi-vertical" ventures in which the partners make complementary contribution 
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
Numerous theorists have studied the reasons why firms choose JV 
arrangements. Kogut (1988) classified various explanations of the creation of JVs into 
three theoretical perspectives: transaction costs, strategic behavior and organizational 
behavior. Williamson (1975，1985) argued that the creation of JVs is to minimize the 
production and transaction costs. The production costs are associated with the 
transformation process while the transaction costs represent the costs of monitoring 
and cheating. These costs are related to asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of 
interaction between the partners. Strategic behavior explanations predict that a JV 
will be chosen when it maximizes profits of the firm, that is, the benefits are larger than 
the costs (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Organizational theory explains the 
creation of JVs by stressing cooperative motivation. The basis of this perspective is 
that the firms have complementary skills and by cooperation, both parties can be better 
off than doing-it-alone (Buckley and Casson, 1988; Lewis, 1990). 
No matter for what reasons a joint venture arrangement is chosen, it has to 
have three elements: common objectives, mutual needs and shared risks (Lewis, 1990). 
Common objectives are the precondition for firms to form JVs. Mutual needs 
motivate firms to tolerate conflicting interests and contracting cultures to jointly 
achieve benefits that either firm cannot reach alone. They also stabilize the relationship 
by balancing the power of each partner. Risk-sharing is also a strong incentive for the 
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firm to cooperate for mutual gain. Everything in an alliance cannot be easily 
forecasted at the start, so if the risks are not shared between the two partners, the 
relationship is not possible to be equitable and lasting. In a word, the presence of these 
three elements is the basic requirement for a successful joint venture. 
Although these three elements are found in most of JVs, firms are not satisfied 
with the performance of their JVs. This is especially so for international joint ventures 
(IJVs) where more conflicts are present because of different environments and 
cultures. According to a study conducted by Lane and Beamish (1990), executives 
from both foreign parent companies and local companies were dissatisfied with the 
performance of more than one half of their IJVs. None were totally satisfied with all of 
their JVs. 
Lewis (1990) argued that three elements, while necessary for the creation of 
IJVs, are not sufficient to assure success. The complexity of the IJVs' environment, 
organizational structure, and management challenges the firms involved to find 
effective ways to succeed in joint venture operations. While other critical factors such 
as similar business interests, common/complementary goals, compatibility in size and 
time scale, environmental factors and agreement on decision-making process serve as 
the prerequisite for joint venture formation and operation, trust has been identified as 
the most important factor to facilitate the effectiveness of JVs and ensure that the 
above factors can be favorable for both partners continuously. A lack of trust can be 
fatal for JVs (Golembiewski and McConkie, 1975; Zucker, 1986). 
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With the increasing strategic importance of IJVs, firms are concerned with the 
relatively unsatisfactory performance of their IJVs. Current studies have captured 
wide range of "hard issues，，of IJV management but few deal with the "soft issues" 
such as trust which is thought to play an increasingly important role in IJV 
management. It is believed that the trust level of the relationship between two partners 
has great influence on the performance of IJVs. This report looks into the trust issues 
in IJVs and the relationship between trust and performance of IJVs. The existing IJV 
literature on trust issues and performance measurement methods is reviewed with the 
objective to recommend a research framework on the relationship between trust and 
IJV performance by measuring trustworthiness of the partners, trust level of the 
partner relationships in IJVs and performance of IJVs. This research framework 
consist of a methodology of case study complemented by a questionnaire survey. 
However, this is only a preliminary study aiming to give some reference for future 
empirical research on this issue. The result of the empirical study can be very 
meaningful for IJV managers to improve their performance by building up and 
nurturing the trust relationship between partners. 
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CHAPTER II 
DYNAMICS OF TRUST 
Trust has been a very important concept in psychology, sociology and business 
(Blau, 1964; Golembiewski and McConkie, 1975; Hirsch, 1978; Zucker, 1986; 
Hosmer, 1995). It is considered to be essential in social life (Blau, 1964; Bok, 1978). 
Scholars have been trying to study the concept of trust and trust-building in 
interpersonal as well as inter-organizational relationships in different contexts (Driscoll, 
1978; Johnson and Swap, 1982; Butler, 1983，1984，1986; Fulk, Brief, and Barr, 
1985). In this section, different aspects of trust are reviewed within the context of 
IJVs. First, the transaction cost economics theory is discussed as a foundation for 
understanding the concept of trust. Second, the importance of trust is emphasized. 
Third, the concept of trust is reviewed by looking at its definition, its components and 
related concepts. Fourth, the measurement of trustworthiness of the partner and the 
trust level of partner relationship are discussed. The important aspects of IJV 
management such as control, conflict, IJVs，instability and cultural difference 
management will also be related to the measurement of trust level between partners. 
Finally, the relationship of trust and IJV performance and the performance 
measurement are reviewed. 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE�and Criticism 
In an IJV, two different parent firms with different strategies, different cultures 
come together and cooperate aiming to both get greater benefit than they do alone. 
Various theories have been generated to explain the incentives of the parent firms to 
set up IJVs from different perspectives such as political, cultural, or economic aspects. 
Among them, transaction cost economics (TCE) theory revitalized by Williamson 
(1975，1985) is a very typical one. 
TCE assumes that managers are solely motivated by efficiency consideration. 
The objective is to minimize the transaction cost which arises from the concerns about 
the opportunistic behavior of the partners. Transaction cost typically includes the 
costs of negotiation and writing contingent contracts, monitoring contractual 
performance, enforcing contractual promises, and addressing breaches of contractual 
promises (Jaskow, 1985). According to TCE, if the costs of a transaction through 
market exchange outweigh the bureaucratic costs of managing an exchange within 
hierarchy, it is more efficient to choose conducting the transaction within hierarchy. 
There are also abundant hybrid forms of transactions between market and hierarchy, 
the general criterion is to minimize the transaction cost. 
Although it provides a sound foundation on motives of IJVs and the selection 
of governance structure, TCE is not sufficient to explain the inter-organizational 
behavior (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). First, TCE treats each transaction as 
independent, while in reality, the cooperative arrangement involves repeated 
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transactions between the same partners in many industries (Doz and Prahalad, 1991). 
The firms make decisions on whether to undertake a transaction and in what form are 
based on the analysis of transaction costs not only of the current transaction but also 
the past ones and future potential ones. Decisions based on an independent transaction 
may be not efficient economically at all. Second, TCE ignores the social context of 
transactions such as the key role of trust in inter-organizational relationships (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992). In fact, firms are not always opportunistic as TCE assumes. 
Trust is inherent in society and unexceptionably in inter-organizational relationships. 
Ignorance of trust may cause more safeguards of both partners which increases the 
transaction cost. 
On the other hand, Madhok (1995b) found that firms usually use two ways to 
manage their inter-organizational relationships - contract-based approach and trust-
based approach. He argued that the characteristics of a transaction - uncertainty, asset 
specificity and frequency - increase the transaction cost. To reduce the transaction 
cost, contract-based approach which is emphasized in TCE tries to invest more on 
safeguards in the conduct of the transaction, while trust-based approach emphasizes 
the high quality of relationship wliich centers on trust. In IJVs, contract-based 
approach is not sufficient. It sometimes increases the transaction cost finally by 
investing more on safeguards which originally aim to reduce the transaction costs. 
Trust-based approach can fill the gap by emphasizing the importance of trust in the 
quality of a relationship. 
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The Importance of Trust 
Managers now realize the importance of trust and try to reduce the transaction 
cost by trust-based approach. Accordingly, in international business and cross-cultural 
management literature, trust has become a very important concept (Lewis, 1990). 
There is a wide agreement that the complementarity of resources among cooperative 
parties is only a base for IJVs which provides potentials for the parties to cooperate. 
The critical factor affecting the success of IJVs is trust For example, Hirsch 
(1978:78) argued that trust is a "public good, necessary for the success of economic 
transactions.，，Zucker (1986:56) stressed that trust is "vital for the maintenance of 
cooperation in society and necessary as grounds for even the most routine, everyday 
interactions." Baird (1990) conducted a survey to assess the perception of Chinese 
and American managers about criteria of joint venture success. Among other factors 
like government support, no language barrier, joint decision making, common goals, 
mutual needs, trust ranks the first place for both American and Chinese managers. 
The widely accepted importance of trust in IJV management make it necessary 
for researchers and managers to understand the concept of trust thoroughly. 
The Concept of Trust 
Having identified the importance of trust in IJV management, researchers are 
trying to understand what trust is in this context from different approaches. Here, the 
concept of trust will be reviewed by looking at how it is defined, how it is analyzed 
into different components and how it is related to concepts of forbearance, reciprocity 
and opportunism which are considered to be also important in IJV management. 
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Definition 
While there is a strong agreement on the importance of trust, current studies 
still fail to develop a suitable definition. Hosmer (1995) explained the reason of the 
problematic definitions. He argued, 'These definitions seem to be based, at least in 
part, upon an underlying assumption of a moral duty with a strong ethical component 
owed by the trusted person to the trusting individuals." This maybe part of the reasons 
why a precise definition so difficult. Many definitions define trust as shared 
expectations regarding future behavior (Golembiewski and McConkie, 1975; Barber, 
1983; Zucker, 1986). For example, after reviewing prior writings on trust in the four 
contexts: individual actions, interpersonal relationships, economic transactions and 
social structures, Hosmer (1995:393) proposed the following definition: 
Trust is the reliance by one person, group, or firm upon a voluntarily 
accepted duty on the part of another person, group, or firm to 
recognize and protect the rights and interests of all others engaged in a 
joint endeavor or economic exchange. 
However, this theme of trust misses the ‘‘vulnerability” implication in trust. 
Zand (1972) had this idea in his definition of trust behavior. He argued that trusting 
behavior increases one's vulnerability and the penalty one suffers from other party's 
opportunistic behavior will exceed the benefit from other party's not conducting 
opportunistic behavior. Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995:20) proposed another 
definition which also takes vulnerability into consideration. They defined trust as “the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that party." In these definitions, 
vulnerability implies risk. That is to say, the concept of trust implies trustor's 
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confidence on the predictability of the trustee under risky situations. Trust requires 
risks to test it (Chiles and McMackin, 1996:85). It is only under the risky or uncertain 
situations that the trusting relationship is needed and can be tested through one party's 
vulnerability to another party. 
One of the weaknesses of these definitions is that they only concern economic 
calculus and ignore social factors in trusting behavior. Trust should include the notion 
that "others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibilities to 
demonstrate a special concern for other's interests above their own." (Barber, 
1983:14) In addition, all of the definitions mentioned so far have failed to include the 
perception of the trustor to his increased long-term interest. Michalos (1990) accepted 
the vulnerability and dependence components, but think the reason why one partner 
would like to be vulnerable to harm is for the interests of some perceived good. 
Components of Trust 
To better understand the concept of trust, some researchers analyze trust by 
dividing it into several components. Deutch (1973) indicated that trust includes two 
components: trusting expectation and trust behavior. Trusting expectation means that 
the trusting person expects helpful or cooperative behavior from the other and trust 
behavior means that the trusting person makes a risky choice, a choice that may be 
costly if the other person does not produce helpful or cooperative behavior (Meeker, 
1983). 
Jones (1983) explained that inter-organizational relationships contain two 
components - the structural and the social. The structural component refers to the 
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complementarity of the resources contributed which is the base of cooperation. It is 
essential for the creation of the cooperative relationship but not sufficient for its 
continuation (Madhok, 1995a). The social component refers to the quality of the 
relationship. Trust has a strong impact on this kind of relationship. It creates a 
common interest and shared expectation which facilitate the tolerance of both partial 
goal conflict and temporary periods of inequity within the relationship (Wilkins and 
William, 1983). Therefore, the two components together lower the perceived 
probability of opportunistic behavior and increase trust. 
Sako (1992) took a different way to divide three types of trust existing in joint 
ventures which are contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. 
Contractual trust is the trust that exists between the partners to ensure the adherence 
to the specific written or oral agreements. Competence trust is the expectation that the 
other firm will perform its role competently. Goodwill trust "refers to mutual 
expectations of open commitment to each other... .Commitment may be defined as the 
willingness to do more than is formally expected." This kind of trust is in highest level 
because 
“there are no explicit promises which are expected to be fulfilled, as in 
the case of contractual trust, nor fixed professional standards to be 
reached, as in the case of competence trust. Instead, goodwill trust 
involves giving one party right to take initiatives assuming that it will 
refrain from unfair advantage taking." (Sako, 1992:38-39) 
McAllister (1995) divided trust into two types - cognition-based trust and 
affect-based trust in interpersonal relationship. The former is grounded in individual 
beliefs about peer reliability and dependability and the latter is grounded in 
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reciprocated interpersonal care and concern. He argued that while the foundations of 
cognition-based trust are external factors that make the behavior of relationship 
partners predictable, the motives of relationship partners provide the foundations for 
affect-based trust. The level of cognition-based trust depends on the success of past 
interaction, the extent of social similarity and organizational context considerations 
(Zucker, 1986). The level of affect-based trust is positively related to the frequency of 
interaction (McAllister, 1995). Concerning the relationship between cognition-based 
trust and affect-based trust, McAllister (1995) argued that the former may be necessary 
for the latter to develop, that is, people's baseline expectations for peer reliability and 
predictability must be met before they will invest further in relationships. 
In the context of JVs, Gulati (1995) identified two forms of trust - knowledge-
based trust and deterrence-based trust. Knowledge-based trust is built up through 
recurrent interaction between partners and is based on the familiarity and confidence to 
the partners. Deterrence-based frw对 emphasizes that the utilitarian considerations may 
also lead to a partner's behaving in a trustworthy manner. In this situation, 
opportunistic behavior of one partner is costly and exceeds the benefit from this kind 
of behavior. The loss may include the loss of repeat business with the same partner, 
loss of reputation (Granovetter, 1985; Macaulay, 1963; Maitland, Bryson and Van de 
Ven, 1985; Gulati, 1995). So it is beneficial for the firm to act in a trustworthy way. 
From the discussion above, we can see that trust is closely related to 
expectations of one partner to another that another partner will not act 
13 
opportunistically under uncertain situations. Different approaches of analyzing trust 
into several components (Deutch, 1973; Jones, 1983; Sako, 1992; McAllister, 1995; 
Gulati, 1995) reflect the multi-facet of trust. However, to have a deep understanding 
on the concept of trust, the related concept such as reciprocity, opportunism and 
forbearance in IJV management should also be well understood. 
Related Concepts: Reciprocity, Opportunism and Forbearance 
To better understand the concept of trust and its various dimensions, it is not 
enough to just look at the single concept of trust. Actually, trust should be understood 
in the framework of whole IJV management and other important concepts related to 
trust. Buckley and Casson (1988) developed a framework for the theory development 
of IJVs. According to them, four concepts are important in understanding IJVs. The 
four concepts are trust, reciprocity, opportunism and forbearance. The key concept is 
trust. "Forbearance becomes possible only when there is reciprocal behavior (Axelrod, 
1984, Oye, 1986) and mutual trust (Thorell, 1986), which in turn only come about 
given an absence of opportunism (Williamson, 1985).，，(Buckley and Casson, 




Meeker (1983:227) explained the concept of reciprocity as follows: 
Reciprocity specifies that one should repay help with help, or at least 
not repay help with harm(positive reciprocity); and/or that one should 
repay harm with harm or at least not repay harm with help (negative 
reciprocity or revenge)... .Reciprocity, like trust, has both an 
expectations and a behavioral component, and cooperative orientation 
is hypothesized to affect both. 
Empirical research on reciprocity in conflict situations has found that subjects 
respond differently to the different behavior of their partners which reflects the 
phenomenon of reciprocity (Meeker, 1983), Reciprocity is essential to build up the 
trust relationship and maintain the long-term cooperation because it can ensure the 
equitable relationship between the partners and make the partners' actions more 
predictable. Positive reciprocity increases the trust level between the partners and 
negative reciprocity prevents the opportunistic behavior of either partner. 
Opportunism 
In IJVs, opportunism is always present. It is more frequently appears in TCE 
which has an important assumption that the risk of opportunism is inherent in many 
transactions. Opportunism has been defined as "self-interest seeking with guile" 
(Williamson, 1975:6) and deceit is considered to be a fundamental element (Macneil, 
1982). Muris (1981:521) argued that opportunism arises when a party "behaves 
contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily 
contrary to the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the 
other party to the performer.，，According to Williamson (1985:47), opportunism 
behaviors include "the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to 
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calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse." The 
probability of opportunism is high when 1) outcomes of cooperation is highly 
uncertain; 2) reputation is difficult to establish; 3) the payoff from opportunism in the 
present period outweighs the discounted present value of future cooperation that is put 
in jeopardy by such action (Hill, 1990). In contrast, the prospect of future interactions 
between the partners over a long run is likely to reduce the incentives of opportunistic 
behavior (Gundlach, 1995). Hill (1990) argued that opportunism does not pay in the 
long run. On one hand, an efficient market will choose those whose behaviors are 
biased towards cooperation. On the other hand, opportunism, the safeguards adopted 
to guard against opportunism or internalization as a response to the threat of 
opportunism, all ultimately dissipate some of the benefits of cooperation. 
Opportunism is deemed to adversely affect trust. While trust implies open 
communication and accurate information exchange, opportunism often involves the 
distort of information disclosure. While trust has positive role in quality of relationship 
between partners, opportunism can be a disaster for the cooperation. Trust can only 
exist with the absence of opportunism. In IJVs, opportunistic perception to the partner 
leads to adoption of tight control systems in IJVs. Trust leads to the value-congruence 
control methods (McAllister, 1995). 
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Forbearance 
Forbearance is another key concept in IJV practices. Buckley and Casson 
(1988) compared forbearance and cheating by saying that if a party refrains from 
cheating, it is said to forbear. They divided cheating into strong cheating and weak 
cheating. Strong cheating means that a party does something that damages its 
partner's interest and the weak cheating means that a party refrains from some actions 
that would benefit someone else. In IJVs, contracts can only stipulate the minimal set 
of obligations. The uncertain and dynamic environment the IJVs are facing make it 
impossible to include everything in the contracts. According to Buckley and Casson 
(1988)，"Failure to honor minimal obligations represents strong cheating, honoring 
only minimal obligations represents weak cheating, while honoring the full obligations 
represents forbearance." 
The vulnerability of each party to another encourages a party to consider the 
response of the other party to its own actions and avoid cheating behavior in return for 
its partner's comparable forbearance. This kind of reciprocal forbearance adds value 
to cooperative benefits in the long run, especially both parties prepare to have long-
term relationship with each other. The basis of mutual forbearance is trust. The 
mutual forbearance and trust stand side by side. Without one of them, opportunism 
may arise and cooperation is difficult. 
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Measurement of Trustworthiness of partners and Trust 
Level of Partner Relationship 
Clear understanding of the concept of trust provides basis for further discussion 
of other aspects of trust. Because trust is a critical factor for an IJV to succeed, it is 
very important for a firm to identify the trustworthiness of its potential partners before 
the initial negotiation stage. It is also important to measure the trust level of a partner 
relationship after the relationship begins so that the sources of trust and distrust can be 
identified for improving the trust relationship. In the next section, the two issues will 
be discussed carefully. 
Measurement of trustworthiness of a partner 
After reviewing antecedents, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) developed 
a model for trust. In Figure 1，they argued that trustor's propensity of trust and 
perception of risk have important influence on trust development of the parties. They 
also found that three factors of a trustee appear to explain a major portion of 
trustworthiness: ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability refers to the group of 
skills, competencies, and characteristics that a party has within some specific domain. 
Benevolence is the tendency of a trustee to do good to the trustor, aside from an 
egocentric profit motive. Integrity means the trustee has a set of principles that the 
trustor finds to be acceptable. If a trustee is perceived as high level on all three 
factors, it is argued that the trustee will be perceived as quite trustworthy. 
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Risk taking is also an very inportant factor for cooperation. Trust leads to risk 
taking. In IJVs, both parties need to take risks because each party commit certain 
resources and it is possible that those resources will be sunk. To assess the risks 
involved in the cooperation, a firm should consider the likelihood of both positive and 
negative outcomes that might occur (Bierman, Bonini, and Hausman, 1969; Coleman, 
1990). Sitkin and Pablo (1992) identified a number of factors that influence the 
perception of risks, such as familiarity of the domain of the problem, organizational 
control systems and social influences. The risk is perceived to be lower when a firm is 
more familiar with the situations of local partner and local business and industry 
environment. The risk is also perceived to be lower when firm adopt a tight 
organizational control systems. The factor of social influence is related to cultural 
difference. The larger the cultural difference between the two parents, the higher the 
level of perceived risk to cooperate. 
FIGURE 1: PROPOSED MODEL OF TRUST 
： i Perceived Risk 
： Ability i 一 
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i Benevolence \j j Trust ，, Risk Taking in Relationship p Outcomes 




Source: Mayer, Davis, Schoorman (1995:715) 
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The decision of whether to cooperate with one partner or not usually is the 
result of an assessment of combined trustworthiness and perceived risk involved. 
Before IJVs are set up, the companies should assess their potential partners' 
trustworthiness carefully according to the dimension mentioned above - ability, 
benevolence and integrity. The companies may find a third party to get some more 
information about the partners, including their past image and practices. Besides, the 
companies should also think about the risks involved for cooperation compared with 
the long-term interest and benefit. If perceived level of trust surpasses the perceived 
risks, then the trustor will engage in cooperation. During the cooperation, trusting 
behaviors will update prior perceptions of the trustworthiness of the partner and the 
risk involved in cooperation which reflect the dynamic nature of trust. 
Measurement of Trust Level of Partner Relationship 
Trust is easier to observe than to measure, partly because this is related to 
human psychology. Several studies have tried to measure trust by measuring the 
conditions that lead to and sustain trust in different contexts (Gabarro, 1978; Butler 
and Cantrell, 1984; Butler, 1991). However, few studies have attempted to measure 
the specific trust level between partners in international joint ventures. Husted (1992) 
argued that the trust level is not so easy to measure when the two parties first get into 
cooperation because both parties want to have largest degree of protection when the 
contract is made. It is more meaningful to study the ways of problem resolution after 
the cooperation begins. He developed a measurement which has the characteristics of 
the two ends of trust levels in terms of low-trust and high-trust syndromes to give a 
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reference for the measurement of trust behavior. (TABLE 1) 
TABLE 1 
A COMPARISON OF TRUST SYNDROMES 
Concept Low-Trust Syndrome High-Trust Syndrome 
Nature of relationship Purely economic exchange Social as well as economic 
exchange 
Interdependence Minimize dependence; short Accept inter-dependence 
term, specific reciprocity 
Commitments Limited, specific Diffuse commitments 
commitments 
Attitude toward Not expected; if it occurs, it Expected as a normal part 
inadequate performance is due to negligence or bad of life 
faith 
Dispute resolution Distributive bargaining Integrative bargaining 
Source: Husted (1992:29) 
Husted (1992) looked at the trust level of partners in five aspects: nature of 
relationship, interdependence, commitments, attitude toward inadequate performance 
and dispute resolution. He argued that different levels of trust have different 
characteristics in these five aspects. First, trust level between partners is high when 
partners' perception of the relationship is only a pure economic exchange and low 
when the partners think the relationship is social as well as economic exchange. 
Second, the level of trust is high when both partners accept interdependence and low 
when they try their best to minimize the dependence, have short term view of the 
relationship and specific reciprocity. Third, the trust level is high when partners have 
diffuse commitments but low when the partners have only limited commitments. 
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Fourth, the trust level is high when the partners think that the inadequate performance 
is a normal part of life and low when the partners don't expect the inadequate 
performance to occur and if it occur, the partners complain each other for bad faith or 
negligence. Finally, the trust level is high when the method of dispute resolution is a 
process of joint-problem solving or "integrative bargaining" through open 
communication and information sharing to find the optimal way for both partners. In 
contrast, the trust level is low if the method of dispute resolution is to negotiate and 
bargain for the interests of each partner. 
Following Hechter's (1987) terminology, Husted (1992) reviewed three 
theoretical perspectives on trust: normativist perspective, rational choice perspective 
and network-structural perspective. He developed the following testable hypotheses 
which flow from each perspective: 1). The greater the shared background 
characteristics of the organizations and key actors involved in an inter-organizational 
relationship, the more likely that the relationship will be characterized by the features 
of the high trust syndrome. 2). The more(less) idiosyncratic the assets involved in the 
transaction, the more(less) likely the occurrence of high-trust syndrome characteristics 
such as integrative bargaining in the resolution of problems. 3). The more(less) 
frequently a transaction occurs, the more(less) likely the occurrence of high-trust 
syndrome characteristics such as integrative bargaining in the resolution of problems. 
4). Other things being equal, the greater(lesser) the number of agents of different 
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organizations sharing multiplexties1, the more(less) likely the inter-organizational 
relationship will exhibit high-trust features. 5). Relationships characterized by 
relatively strong ties (as measured by duration, frequency, intensity, etc) are more 
likely to exhibit high-trust features than those relations characterized by weak ties. 6). 
Other things being equal, the denser the social network among agents of different 
organizations, the more likely the relationship between the organizations will exhibit 
high-trust features. 
Lewis (1990) proposed to measure the quality of a relationship between 
partners from the following key dimensions: fundamentals (the basis of cooperation 
such as the mutual needs, common objectives), problem solving, understanding, 
communications, trust, acceptance and outlook (TABLE 2). All of these dimensions 
reflect the level of trust between the partners. So they can also be used as a checklist 
for the measurement of the trust level between partners. The level of trust is high 
when the relationship shows the characteristics presented in the left side of the table. 
On the contrary, the level of trust is low when the relationship shows the 
characteristics presented in the right side of the table. 
1 Multiplexity: It refers to the number of ties of different contents between the parties. The contents 




SOME MEASURES OF A RELATIONSHIP 
Stronger Weaker 
Fundamentals 
We clearly need each other and are Our interests are not well aligned, or one 
willing to make compromises to reach of us is much more exposed than the 
our mutual objective other 
We are working to improve our Our relationship depends on our 
relationship separate from other matters substantive gains 
Problem-solving 
It has become easier to raise issues, Key issues are not raised 
resolve our difference 
Conflicts are a normal part of our Conflict resolution is by acquiescence, 
relationship and get resolved by coercion, or reference to rights 
discussion 
Understanding 
We have a growing awareness of each They do not appreciate our needs, skills, 
other's interests, abilities priorities 
Communications 
We have extensive formal and informal We are limited to infrequent formal 
communications discussions 
Issues are raised early Problems tend to get worse before we 
discuss them 
We always consult before making key We have been surprised by their 
decisions decisions 
Trust 
We can always rely on each other when it It is risky for us to rely on them 
counts 
Acceptance 
Their actions tell us we are important to They treat us as less than equal 
them 
We actively work on each other's needs The relationship has caused significant 
frustrations 
We are becoming adapted to each other's We are as uneasy with their style now as 
culture when we began 
Some real friendships have grown We feel like strangers to each other 
Outlook 
We are exploring new opportunities Our scope is the same or has narrowed 
together since we began 
Source: Lewis (1990:251) 
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Trust Level Measurement and Control, Conflict, 
Instability and Cultural Difference 
We treat trust as a critical factor for the success of IJVs because it has great 
influential power on various aspects of IJV management. Organizational control 
system，conflict resolutions, IJV instability and cultural difference are all important 
aspects of IJV management. Trust is closely associated with them. As a result, the 
situation of these aspects of an IJV can reflect the trust level between two partners in 
the IJV. First, trust plays an important roles in IJV management by influencing IJVs， 
control systems. Typically, the control mechanism in international joint ventures 
includes contracts, policies and procedures, staffing and reporting structure (Beamish 
and Wang, 1989). Trust can reduce the need for safeguards against the opportunism 
and uncertainty and thus reduce the transaction costs, increase the flexibility and 
tolerance, especially in the situation of ambiguity (Madhok, 1995a). Therefore, the 
control system can reflect the trust level of the joint venture. For example, in relation 
to performance evaluation system, result-oriented systems show higher level of trust 
than process-oriented systems; the encouragement of self-appraisal also represents high 
trust level; future-oriented control systems show higher level of trust than past-
oriented systems; less number of managerial levels beyond the immediate supervisor 
involved in appraisal indicates the higher level of trust (Cummings, 1983). 
Trust also influences the creation and resolution of conflicts in IJVs. Because 
of multi-parent and multi-cultural characteristics, conflicts are very common in 
international joint ventures. The major sources of conflicts are social culture, national 
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culture, corporate culture, strategic direction and management practices of the 
organization. The attitude of the partners to the creation of conflicts and the ways that 
the conflicts are resoluted reflect the trust level of the relationship between partners. 
For example, if the partners treat conflicts as normal and try to raise the issue as early 
as possible to solve the conflicts by open communication and mutual understanding, 
the trust level is perceived to be high. Otherwise, if partners think it is the other 
party's fault and cannot openly communicate to solve the problem when conflicts arise, 
this represent low level of trust. 
The stability of an IJV also reflect the trust level of partners. Equity is the 
precondition for the stability of an IJV. The instability of an IJV can be occurred either 
from the very beginning of the cooperation or after some time of the cooperation. 
Trust can increase the flexibility and thus increase the partners' ability to adapt to 
change by influencing the nature and pattern of interaction (Madhok, 1995a). 
Therefore, the instability of an IJV shows, to some extent, low level of trust 
relationship between partners because it partly represents that the partners have no 
ability to adapt to change with the development of the IJV which causes the instability 
of the IJV. ( Here, instability means IJVs fail in adapting changes quickly and come to 
an end without reaching the parents' strategic objectives.) 
� The problem of cultural difference is obvious and usually crucial in IJV 
management. IJVs usually operate under more uncertain environments in which more 
problems or issues may arise. The cultural differences restrain the resolution of these 
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problems and issues. Many conflicts between partners in IJVs come from cultural 
differences, both national level and corporate level, and the ensuing different structural 
priority, management style, system for communication, motivation, rewarding, 
punishment, perception of need for change and so on. Cultural differences can be the 
greatest barrier for the trust relationship to develop and sustain. Horng(1993) argued 
that there is a negative relationship between cultural differences and trust. He also 
linked cultural differences, trust with business strategy and control that headquarters to 
its foreign subsidiaries (see TABLE 3). He argued that both cultural difference and 
trust have influences on the MNCs，business strategy and control. While cultural 
differences are likely to reduce MNC's flexibility in pursuing various type of business 
strategy and control, trust can open up more options for MNCs. Specifically, the 
greater the cultural differences between headquarters and subsidiaries, the more likely 
the subsidiary is to pursue low cost strategy and financial control. On the other hand, 
the greater the trust between headquarters and subsidiaries, the more likely the 
subsidiaries are to pursue differentiation strategy and strategic control. 
TABLE 3 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, TRUST AND BUSINESS 
STRATEGY AND CONTROL 
Cultural differences increase 
4 — 
Strategy Low cost strategy Differentiation strategy 
Control Financial control Strategic control 
• 
Trust increase 
Source: modified based on Horng (1993:177)，Figure 1: “A Model of the Proposed 
Relationships among Cultural Differences, Trust, Business Strategy, Control and 
Transfer of managers." 
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In this chapter so far, we discuss the dynamics of trust in IJV management 
based on the existing literature. We emphasize the importance of trust for the success 
of IJVs. It is believed that trust has a positive relationship with the performance of an 
IJV. However, what is the criteria of "success"? How to measure the performance of 
an IJV? In next section, we will present performance evaluation method used by the 
existing literature. This is helpful for designing the questionnaire and exploring the 
correlation of trust and the performance of an IJV. 
The Relationship Between Trust and Performance and 
the Measurement of Performance 
Sako (1992) argued that trust tends to create the right conditions for successful 
performance of joint ventures. He identified three major conditions for transaction 
efficiency which are crucial for success of joint venture performance: promote 
information flows, increase effort exertion and reduce the need to incur transaction 
costs because of the opportunistic behavior. Contractual trust and goodwill trust 
encourage the disclosure of accurate information which might be withheld for self-
interest. The monitoring cost can be reduced when contractual trust ensures the 
promises in the contract to be fulfilled and competence trust ensures the certain quality 
is reached and the tasks are properly done. In addition, goodwill trust usually ensures 
the high level of effort exertion and flexibility which is very important for success in the 
dynamic environment. 
It is hypothesized that trust has a positive relationship with the performance of 
an IJV because no matter how the performance is measured, the above-mentioned 
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three conditions leading to the transaction efficiency are always the conditions that lead 
to the satisfactory result of an IJV performance. 
Early studies used a variety of financial indicators such as profitability, growth 
and cost position, or objective measures of performance such as the survival of the 
IJV, its duration, instability of its ownership, and renegotiation of the JV contract. 
Yet, these financial and objective measures embody potential limitations that are 
critical to evaluation of IJV performance. Anderson(1990) argues that financial 
measure are usually poor performance evaluation for joint ventures because joint 
ventures may be making satisfactory progress toward longer-term goals, or meeting 
current goals that are not financial in nature. Objective measures may be also 
inadequate sometimes. For example, ownership changes after entry were corrections 
of mistakes made when the subsidiaries were first established. In other cases, they 
represent adaptations to changes in environmental conditions, which sometimes 
resulted from actions of the joint ventures themselves. In the latter cases, joint venture 
instability may be seen as a sign of success, not failure. 
Michael and Louis (1991) suggest IJVs performance should be evaluated 
versus objectives of the parent company. Financial and objective measures may fail to 
do so. Killing(1983) and Beamish(1984) used a single-item perceptual measure of a 
parent's satisfaction with an IJVs performance and also utilized subjective 
performance measures for each of a limited number of individual dimensions of the 
IJV. Nevertheless, these types of measures remain subjective and are thus exposed to 
29 
serious limitation and biases. 
Major indicators used by parents' assessment of IJV performance can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Sales level, market share, profitability, cost control. 
• Management of venture, technology development, product design, 
manufacturing/quality control, labor productivity, marketing, distribution 
• Reputation, customer service, need for parent involvement. 
The performance evaluation of joint ventures has been a challenge for parent 
companies. It is unlikely to be assessed accurately using only the financial measures, 
even less accurate using objective or subjective measures. Parent companies should 
mainly consider whether the strategic objectives have been met or to what extent they 
have been met using all the information available to have a equitable evaluation on the 
performance of the joint ventures. It is suggested that performance evaluation should 
be conducted using both objective and subjective indicators. The success of an IJV 




The current empirical studies on IJVs fail to address trust and other related 
concepts like reciprocity, forbearance, and opportunism (Parkhe, 1993). A systematic 
theory framework concerning trust issue in IJV is not well developed yet. Although 
some studies have discussed the concept of trust, the conditions of trust, the 
relationship between trust and some other issues, specific methodology on how to 
measure the trustworthiness of the partner, how to measure the level of trust 
relationship has not been proposed effectively. Furthermore, the relationship between 
trust and performance of an IJV has not been clarified empirically. In this report, a 
research method of using case studies complemented by questionnaire survey is 
proposed and designed to address some important issues concerning trust and its 
relationship with performance in international joint ventures. 
Because there is still little systematic theory in this area, case study is a very 
effective way to explore some hypothesis and insights on the issues and permit a 
deeper understanding of soft variables such as trust. Case study method is chosen 
because it matches our research questions better than other research strategies. 
According to Yin (1988)，there are five research strategies available in the social 
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sciences: experiments, surveys, archival analysis, histories, and case studies. To 
determine when to use what strategy, three conditions should be considered: types of 
research questions, extent of control over behavioral events and degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. Case study is used “when a 'how' and 
‘why，question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the 
investigator has little or no control." For a study of trust issue, it can be seen that 
“why，，and "how" questions for gaining insights on this issue is more important than 
the factual questions of “what，，，“who，，and “where，，，so it is appropriate to use case 
study method. 
Although case study is essential in studying trust issue in IJVs, it is not 
sufficient because it develops hypothesis and theories based on the relatively small 
samples. It is necessary to test these hypothesis and theories in a wider range of 
samples. So the questionnaire survey is also suggested to complement case studies. 
Research Questions 
Five dimensions related to trust in joint venture management are explored 
based on literature review. They are: 
1. How a firm selects its partner by measuring the trustworthiness of its partner 
before cooperation and how it updates the perception of trustworthiness of 
its partner after the cooperation begins. 
2. Measurement of trust level of the relationship (related to control and conflict 
and performance). 
3. Identify the sources of the distrust and the reasons. 
4. Identify the sources that contribute the trust relationship. 
5. The relationship between trust and performance of an IJV. 
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Propositions 
The propositions for these four research questions are explored as follows: 
1. Measurement of trustworthiness of a partner 
A. A firm consciously and unconsciously measures the trustworthiness of the 
potential partner before entering the IJV arrangement. 
B. Common background and similar culture have positive relationship with the 
trustworthiness of a partner (Husted, 1992). 
C. Trustworthiness of a partner (trustee) is positively related to the personal 
relationship between trustee and trustor (Buckley and Casson, 1988). 
D. Trustworthiness of a party (trustee) has a positive relationship with the 
perceived competence, integrity, benevolence of the other party (trustor) to 
it (Mayer, 1995). 
E. Trustworthiness of a partner (trustee) is positively related the successful 
past interaction between the party (trustee) and another (trustor) (Lewis, 
1990). 
F. Trustworthiness of a party (trustee) is positively related to the good 
reputation of this party in the industry (Buckley and Casson, 1988). 
G. Trustworthiness of a party (trustee) is negatively related to the risks the 
other party (trustor) perceived in cooperating with this party (trustee) 
(Mayer, 1995). The perceived risk level is related to the familiarity of the 
domain of the problem, organizational control systems and social influences 
(Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). 
2. Measurement of trust level of the relationship 
A. The level of trust is high when the relationship is equitable and both 
partners concern each other's needs (Lewis, 1990). 
B. The level of trust is high when both partner put effort and resources to 
build up trust and nurture it (Lewis, 1990). 
C. The level of trust is low when the partners treat the relationship as purely 
economic exchange for self-interest seeking and high when the partners 
think the relationship to be social as well as economic relationship (Husted, 
1992). 
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D. The level of trust is low when the partners try to minimize the dependence 
and have short-term view for the relationship and high when the partners 
accept interdependence (Husted, 1992). 
E. The level of trust is low when the partner has less commitment to the 
venture and high when the partner have high level of commitment to the 
venture (Husted, 1992). 
F. The level of trust is high when the partners perceived conflicts to be 
unavoidable and are willing to compromise to resolve the problems 
(Husted, 1992). 
G. The level of trust is high when the partners have extensive formal and 
informal communications and the problems issued earlier before they got 
worse (Lewis, 1990). 
H. In relation to performance evaluation, the level of trust is high when the 
performances system is result-oriented instead of process oriented, when 
the self-appraisal is encouraged, when the control system is future-oriented 
instead of past-oriented and when there are less number of managerial 
levels beyond the immediate supervisor involved in appraisal (Cummings, 
1983). 
3. The sources of the distrust and the reasons (Mead, 1994) 
A. Strategic mismatch about the long-term interest. 
B. The original contract is not equitable and biases to one partner. 
C. Lack of understanding or acceptance about personal differences because of 
different cultures and background. For example, different values, corporate 
cultures, and management practices. 
D. Lack of commitment of one or both partners. 
E. The situation has changed that the original contract and profit sharing are 
not equitable any longer. 
F. No open communication, i.e., Information asymmetry 
4. The sources that contribute the trust relationship (Mead, 1994) 
A. Equitable, workable contract initially and adapt to change when necessary. 
B. Effective corporate culture that coordinate the multi-cultures involved. 
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C. Commitment of both partner is an important source of the trust 
relationship. 
D. Open communication for each partner's needs, objectives and decisions 
making. 
5. The relationship between trust and performance evaluation of an IJV 
A. Trust level between partners has a positive relationship with the 
performance of an IJV. 
Data Collection 
Multiple data collection methods will be used in this study. Personal interviews 
with CEO of both parent companies if possible; 2). Unstructured personal interview 
with selected IJVs foreign and local managers; 3). Attendance, if permitted, IJV 
meetings; 4). Participating observation; 5). Other data sources about the selected 
companies such as INTERNET，newspaper clippings, talking with employees and 
companies' annual report, etc. 
Stages for Case Study and survey 
Parkhe (1993) argued that the most efficient way to develop IJV theory in 
current evolutionary stage may be the one that begins with exploratory research, 
followed by descriptive research and then by explanatory research. Base on this 
thinking, the case study is suggested to be divided into three stages. Stage one is the 
initial single case studies. Stage two is systematic replications - literal and theoretical 
replication of the initial single case studies and stage three is a questionnaire survey for 
testing the findings in the first two stages within a large number of sample size and 
helping lead to the theory development and practical implications. 
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Initial single case study is served as an exploratory device for further study. 
The selection of the case IJV is very critical for the effectiveness of the whole study. 
In general, convenience, access, and geographic proximity can be the main criteria for 
selecting the single case. This makes the investigator easier to develop prolonged 
relationship and have closer and deeper investigation to the selected IJV (Yin, 1988). 
In this stage, the inquiry can be much broader and less focused than the ultimate data 
collection. The propositions developed before can be verified and further perfected 
during this stage. Other relevant field of questions may also be explored. 
In Stage two, multiple case study method suggested by Parkhe (1993) which 
replicates the single case in the first stage is used. For example, in the first stage, the 
IJV between companies Xi and X2 headquartered in Yi and Y2，and operating in the 
same industry Zi (XiYiZi/X2Y2Zi) is followed by the multiple case design using 
replicate logic. Specifically, for literal replication, one(XiYiZi) or another(X2Y2Zi) of 
the initial companies is examined in partnership with a third company from the same 
country of origin and industry as the original partner X3Y2Zi or X4Y1Z1). The cases 
may also include an IJV involving different companies than Xi or X2, controlling for 
country of origin and industry. For theoretical replication, “other IJVs are deliberately 
selected such that they are theoretically expected to yield contrary results for 
predictable reasons.，，(Parkhe, 1993:251) For example, cultural difference is an 
important factor affecting the trust level of the relationships between the partners, so 
the IJV between local partner and the third company headquartered in third country 
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may be chosen. The replication of the initial single study in this stage can effectively 
verify the propositions and exploratory results found in the single case study and is 
helpful for later theoretical modeling 
In Stage Three, questionnaire survey is conducted to test the results of the case 
studies and gain more insights on the research questions in a larger sample. The 
sample should include different characteristics of IJVs and be representative. A 
questionnaire is designed for survey and should be revised accordingly as the case 
studies going on (see Appendix). 
Theory Building and Practical Implications 
The final stage is the analysis of the results aiming to develop theory 
framework concerning to the trust issue in IJV management and the relationship 
between trust and performance of an IJV. The results should also explore some 
implications for managers to build up and nurturing trust relationship to improve the 
performance of the IJV. In this stage, the prepositions developed before the case 
studies and the survey should be tested and verified accordingly. Yin (1988) suggested 
three methods to analyze the results which include pattern-matching, explanation 
building and time series techniques. Some other methods like repeated observations, 
case survey are also used often. 
Pattern-matching is one of the most desirable techniques for case-study 
analysis. It compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with 
several alternative predictions). If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case 
.,:..i .广. 
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study to strengthen its internal validity. Explanation-building is a special type of 
pattern-matching. It is to explain the phenomenon by stipulating a set of casual links 
about it. The explanation should be able to lead to recommendations for management 
practices as well as contribute to theory-building. Time series method is to match a 
trend of data points with a) a theoretically significant trend specified before the onset 
of the investigations, b) some rival trend, also specified earlier, c) any trend based on 
some artifact or threat to internal validity. The method can be simple or complex. The 
degree of complexity depends on the nature of the trends and the variables involved. 
FIGURE 2: PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Research questions � prepositions 
z 
questionnaire survey 4 case studies 
± * 
theory building and practical implication 
TABLE 4: STAGES FOR CASE STUDY AND SURVEY 
Stage One: XlYlZl/X2Y2Zl 
Stage Two: X2Y2Z1/X3Y2Z1 or X1Y1Z1/X4Y1Z1 (literal replication) 
X1Y1Z1/X3Y3Z1 or X2Y2Z1/X4Y4Z1 (theoretical replication) 
Stage Three: Free samples (questionnaire survey) 
Stage Four: Analysis of the results 
Xi= company; Yi = country of origin; Z, = industry 
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In conclusion, the methodology proposed here suggests that it is suitable to use 
case study complemented by questionnaire survey method for the further empirical 
study on the trust issue in IJVs. Five dimensions of trust issues in IJV management are 
identified to be important for the further research. The prepositions of these research 
questions are explored, the data collection methods are suggested, the detailed case 
study method is provided and finally, the questionnaire is designed for the survey. It is 
hoped that the proposed research method can give the researchers a reference for the 





With the increasing importance of cooperation for firms in the international 
business field, firms are very critical for their cooperative strategies. Joint venture, as 
the most popular form of cooperation, has drawn great attention by scholars and 
general managers. While the "hard issues，’ in the context of IJV management such as 
transaction costs, management control system, decision-making process need to be 
considered properly, the “soft issues" such as trust has been treated as the key issue for 
the success of an IJV. It is believed that the trusting relationship between partners can 
improve the performance of an IJV. The questions of how to build up trust 
relationship between partners and how to nurture this kind of relationship are always 
challenging general managers of parents companies as well as joint venture managers. 
To answer these questions, a deep understanding for the concept of trust and its 
different dimensions is necessary. This report is a preliminary study on these issues 
and the proposed methodology of case study complemented by questionnaire survey is 




1. What are the nationality of the partners of the joint venture? 
2. What is the proportion of the asset contribution for the joint venture? 
3. How many employees does the joint venture has? 
Foreign party ； Local party . 
4. How many people in top management team? 
Foreign party ； Local party . 
5. Do you have past interaction with your partner? (if no, go to 7) 
a) yes b) no 
6. Do you think the past interaction successful? 
a) very successful 
b) successful 
c) somewhat successful 
d) not very successful 
e) severe failure 
7. What is your general perception to your partner? 
1 2 3 4 5 
competent not competent 
honest not honest 
benevolence not benevolence 
good reputation bad reputation 
high perceived risks low perceived risks 
reliable not reliable 
open not open 
overall, trustworthy overall, not trustworthy 
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8. How many times do you spend time with your partner to have informal extra-work 
activities, such as dinner, go hiking in one month? 
a) 1-2 
b) 3-4 
c) more than 4. 
9. Can the colleague of your partner's be your personal friend if your business 
cooperation is over now? 
a) yes 
b) probably yes 
c) don't know 
d) probably no 
e) definitely no. 
10. Do you think your relationship is equitable? 
1= very equitable, 3= somewhat equitable, 5= not equitable at all. 
1 2 3 4 5 
a) Profit sharing 
b) decision making 
c) resource contribution 
d) employee compensation 
11. If there are chances again, would you consider to cooperate with the current 
partner again? 
a) definitely yes 
b) very possible 
c) possible 
d) maybe not 
e) not possible at all 
12. Do you think the independence of your partner is very important when you make 
any decisions? 
a) extremely important 
b) very important 
c) somewhat important 
d) not very important 
e) not important at all 
13. To what extent you participate in the management of the joint venture? 
a) only strategic management issue 
b) strategic and middle level 
c) operational level 
d) all levels 
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14. Do you think the joint venture is very important for your company? 
a) very important 
b) important 
c) somewhat important 
d) not very important 
e) not important at all 
15. Do you think the conflicts between the partners are unavoidable? 
16. Are you willing to compromise when the conflicts arise? 
a) always yes 
b) often yes 
c) sometimes yes 
d) rarely yes 
e) always no 






18. Before your partner does something or make a decision which would affect the 
joint venture or your company, how often do they ask your opinion? 
a) They always ask my opinion. 
b) They often ask my opinion. 
c) They sometimes ask my opinion. 
d) They seldom ask my opinion. 
e) They never ask my opinion. 
19. Do you think the joint venture has strong corporate culture which reflects both 
parents' culture? 
a) very strong 
b) strong 
c) somewhat strong 
d) weak 
e) very weak 
20. When an employee is evaluated, how important is the result(e.g., sales, output per 
day) compared to process(e.g.，time of lateness)? 
a) Result is much more important than process 
b) Result is a little more important than process. 
c) Result is almost equally important than process. 
d) Result is less important than process. 
e) Result is much less important than process. 
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21. Who are involved in the evaluation of the operational workers' performance? 
1). immediate supervisor, 2) department head, 3). top management; 
a) 1) only; 
b) 1) and 2); 
c) 1) and 2) and 3); 
d) others. Please specify 
22. How important are informal, personal relationship and communications with other 
partners in joint ventures? 
a) extremely important 
b) very important 
c) somewhat important 
d) not very important 
e) not important at all 
23. What kind of strategy and control do you think your parent company is adopting? 
a) Low cost strategy/financial control 
b) Low cost strategy/strategic control 
c) Differentiation strategy/financial control 
d) Differentiation strategy/strategic control 
24. What do you think are the major sources of trust in the relationship with your 
partner? (rank from 1 to 8) 
a) past interaction 
b) mutual needs 
c) common objectives 
d) equal status 
e) open communication 
f) similar background 
g) personal relationship between managers 
h) others (please specify )• 
25. How often do you release the distorted, unreal information to your partner? 
a) always 




26. In general, how satisfied has your firm been with the IJV's overall performance? 
a) very satisfied 
b) relatively satisfied 
c) somewhat satisfied 
d) relatively dissatisfied 
e) very dissatisfied 
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27. For each of the following, rate the JV's actual performance versus initial 
projections at the time the venture was formed. 














Need for Parent Involvement 
Overall Performance 
“1” represents "very satisfactory" and “5” represents "very dissatisfactory." 
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